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THE BLIND LEADING THE DEAF: AN INVESTIGATION OF
THE INCONSISTENT ACCOMMODATIONS THE JUSTICE
SYSTEM PROVIDES TO PEOPLE WHO ARE DEAF
ABSTRACT
Historically, and to this day, people with disabilities have not
been considered capable of determining their own needs. Instead,
the general population has taken it upon themselves to dictate what
accommodations they shall receive.1 This becomes particularly prob-
lematic for the deaf community when interacting with the criminal
justice system, where a lack of communication is synonymous with a
lack of justice.2 In this situation, the state should defer to the individ-
ual’s understanding of their needs, or carry the burden of proving
that another accommodation is equally effective.
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2. See Jamie McAlister, Deaf and Hard-of-Hearing Criminal Defendants: How You
Gonna Get Justice If You Can’t Talk to the Judge? 26 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 163, 163–64 (1994).
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INTRODUCTION
Ironically, the access inequality faced by members of the deaf
community often goes unheard by hearing society. The lack of access
to effective communication accommodations can create ramifications
ranging from slight nuisance to serious endangerment of the rights
and liberty of deaf individuals.3 Nowhere in our society is the possi-
ble peril more evident than in the criminal justice system.4 When
the state fails to provide appropriate access to communication for
deaf people interacting with the criminal justice system, the miscar-
riage of justice can be severe and devastating.5 While the nation has
enacted statutory protections designed specifically to guard against
these injustices, courts’ exposition of the relevant standards are
varied and sometimes incompatible with the purpose of the statute.6
In this Note, I will examine the different interpretations of the
standard needed to receive compensatory damages under the Ameri-
can with Disabilities Act (ADA). The question of the proper standard
was submitted for Supreme Court review, but was denied certiorari
in late 2018.7 The petitioner claimed a plaintiff must show they were
denied the accommodation as a result of animus because the alter-
native, deliberate indifference, was too small a hurdle for a plaintiff
to overcome.8 This Note will expand on the different circuits’ applica-
tions of the standards and eventually concur with the Ninth Circuit,
both in its application of deliberate indifference and in its contention
that, in practice, no circuit requires a showing of animus to receive
compensatory damages.9 This Note will conclude by relating this
analysis to the experience of people who are deaf in the criminal
3. See Kelly McAnnany & Aditi Kothekar Shah, With Their Own Hands: A Com-
munity Lawyering Approach to Improving Law Enforcement Practices in the Deaf
Community, 45 VAL. U.L. REV. 875, 876 (2011).
4. See generally McAlister, supra note 2.
5. Id. at 164–65.
6. See, e.g., Updike v. Multnomah Cty., 870 F.3d 939, 949 (9th Cir. 2017), cert.
denied, 139 S. Ct. 55 (2018).
7. See id.
8. Id. at 950.
9. Id. at 951.
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justice system and determine that, specifically for the deaf commu-
nity but also for all disabled Americans, the Ninth Circuit’s under-
standing of the standard is the most congruous with the purpose of
the ADA and ought to be applied uniformly across the country.10
Part I will provide some necessary background on the nature of
the deaf community, their language, and their culture. Part II will
then provide an overview of the ADA, its history, goals, and function
in the criminal justice system. Part III will examine the breadth of
deaf experience in the criminal justice system and how it differs
from a hearing person’s experience. This overview is essential to
fully understand the need for a standard like the one proposed by the
Ninth Circuit.11 Part IV will examine the case, Updike v. Multnomah
County, that was submitted for certiorari, and the perceived conflict
between the deliberate indifference and animus standards.12 Through
an analysis of certain cases presented before all the circuits, Part IV
will demonstrate that the petitioner’s argument does not hold up and
that there are truly no circuits applying an animus standard.13 How-
ever, it must be determined which circuit’s application of the delib-
erate indifference standard is the proper interpretation. In Part V,
this Note will argue that the intended purpose of the ADA requires
the courts to apply the Ninth Circuit’s analysis and in Part VI,
consider why this standard has not been universally adopted.
I. WHO ARE THE MEMBERS OF THE DEAF COMMUNITY?
“Approximately twenty million people . . . or 8.6% of the [ ] United
States population . . . are deaf or hard of hearing.”14 Lower case ‘d’
deaf refers to the condition of deafness; many people identify only as
deaf and do not choose to associate themselves with Deaf culture.15
Often people who identify as deaf became deaf late in life or commu-
nicate through something other than American Sign Language
(ASL).16 People who identify as Deaf, with a capital ‘D’, view them-
selves as being a part of Deaf culture; they are Deaf and proud and
often communicate through ASL, which they consider to be their
10. Id. at 949–50.
11. See id.
12. Updike, 870 F.3d at 949–50.
13. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 24–25, Multnomah v. Updike, 139 S. Ct. 55
(2018) (No. 17-1222); Updike, 870 F.3d 939. In denying certiorari, the Supreme Court im-
plied that there was no split among the circuits to be resolved regarding the standard.
14. McAnnany & Shah, supra note 3, at 876.
15. CAROL PADDEN & TOM HUMPHRIES, INSIDE DEAF CULTURE 1 (2006).
16. Community and Culture—Frequently Asked Questions, NAT’L ASS’N OF THE DEAF,
https://www.nad.org/resources/american-sign-language/community-%20and-culture-fre
quently-asked-questions [https://perma.cc/3JKX-5WDK].
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“native language.”17 For the purpose of this Paper I will use “deaf” to
refer to the entire community, and “Deaf” to refer to the portion of the
larger community that consider themselves part of Deaf Culture.
America’s hearing and deaf communities exist in separate
worlds.18 The deaf community is often invisible to members of the
hearing community.19 When deafness is acknowledged, hearing so-
ciety defines it pathologically, purely as an audiological malfunc-
tion.20 A conflict arises because many Deaf people reject the sole
basis of hearing people’s understanding of them: the classification
as “disabled”.21 A large portion of the deaf community do not con-
sider their deafness to be a disability, but instead interpret deafness
as belonging in a culture and community.22
Many people who are deaf do not feel like they are defined by
their inability to hear, but rather choose to identify themselves as
members of a “cultural and linguistic minority.”23 Andrew Solomon, a
scholar and author on cultural studies, explained that the notion of
disability is often a result of pressure to conform to hearing society:
“Those who learn forced English while being denied sign emerge semi-
lingual rather than bilingual, and they are disabled people. But for the
rest of us, it is no more a disability than being Japanese would be.”24
While this argument might seem utterly shocking to a hearing
person, it is important to understand that ‘disability’ is a label and
limitation imposed by the dominant culture.25 The societal barriers
faced by a deaf person are the same obstacles a hearing person
would encounter if they were encompassed in a world defined by
deaf culture.26 Throughout the later discussion of appropriate accom-
modations,27 it is critical to remember that these same accommoda-
tions would be required by hearing people living in a world created
for the deaf.
17. Id.; Andrew Solomon, Defiantly Deaf, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 28, 1994), https://www
.nytimes.com/1994/08/28/magazine/defiantly-deaf.html [https://perma.cc/4JCG-J3CF].
18. See Lydia Callis, Deaf and Hearing Worlds: Bridging the Cultural Gap, HUF-
FINGTON POST (Oct. 4, 2017, 11:15 AM), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/deaf-and-hear
ing-worlds-bridging-the-cultural-gap_b_59d4f4f3e4b02508a0a07b9b [https://perma.cc
/YGQ5-G7TY].
19. See generally Stephen Wilbers, Why American Needs Deaf Culture: Cultural
Pluralism and the Liberal Arts Tradition, 59 SIGN LANGUAGE STUD. 195 (1988).
20. TARA POTTERVELD, LAW ENFORCEMENT INTERPRETING FOR DEAF PERSONS ix (2012).
21. See Mary Ellen Aldrich, Being Deaf Is Not A Disability, 48 FREE PRESS, 11 (Apr.
2017).
22. See id.
23. POTTERVELD, supra note 20, at ix.
24. Solomon, supra note 17.
25. See id.
26. See id.
27. See infra text accompanying notes 90–104.
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Deaf culture is not based on the medical understanding of deaf-
ness as a disability, but on a strong sense of community, growing
from Deaf pride.28 Deaf pride is powerful. So powerful in fact, that
many Deaf people say they would not want to be hearing if they had
the choice.29 Deaf culture is rich with its own distinct norms, tradi-
tions, and art.30
A. Variations of Sign Language as a Means of Communication for
Deaf Individuals
ASL is one of the bastions of Deaf culture and powerfully con-
nects members of the Deaf community to one another.31 ASL is held
in such high regard because it was a right not easily won.32 Until the
1980s, use of ASL was severely repressed by hearing educators in
favor of oralism, which forces speech and lip-reading and forbids sign
language.33 Eventually however, ASL was recognized as “a distinct
language from English with its own grammar and linguistic rules.”34
ASL is not used universally within the deaf community and is
not the only method of signed communication available; some people
who are deaf communicate through Signed Exact English (SEE),
which retains the grammatical order of English.35 Pidgin Signed
English (PSE) is another means of visual communication, which com-
bines ASL and SEE.36 A person fluent in SEE or PSE would need a
certified interpreter who understands the difference between the
different signed languages in order to be able to fully and effectively
communicate.37 Unfortunately, hearing society’s minimal understand-
ing of signed language means that the people tasked with providing
the necessary accommodations might not know enough to ensure
the correct interpreter is present.38
28. See Solomon, supra note 17.
29. See id.
30. See PADDEN & HUMPHRIES, supra note 15, at 150.
31. See Aldrich, supra note 21.
32. See Solomon, supra note 17.
33. See id. The use of sign language was banned by a gathering of international deaf
educators at the 1880 Milan Conference. This forced many deaf students to sign in secret
or risk punishment by their teachers.
34. POTTERVELD, supra note 20, at x. In 1960 William Stokoe, a Professor at Gallaudet
University, Americans only deaf college, published his findings establishing ASL as a legiti-
mate language. In 1964 Congress issued the Babbidge Report concluding oral education
of the deaf was a failure. Deaf Culture Timeline, SIGN LANGUAGE INTERPRETERS (Mar.
2013), https://signlanguageco.com/deaf-culture-timeline [https://perma.cc/RK3L-2G3V].
35. See Abdallah, supra note 1, at 207–09.
36. See id.
37. See Laurent Clerc National Deaf Education Center, Working with Interpreters,
GALLAUDET U. (2015), https://www3.gallaudet.edu/clerc-center/info-to-go/interpreting
/working-with-interpreters.html [https://perma.cc/N6EN-GY5X].
38. See Abdallah, supra note 1, at 210–11.
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A minority of the deaf community communicates orally and relies
on lip-reading.39 Ninety percent of deaf children are born to hearing
parents and are often not exposed to ASL from birth—these people
often discover Deaf culture, pride, and ASL later in life.40 Hearing
parents often reject ASL and instead insist on speech training and
lip-reading in hopes of communicating orally with their child.41 How-
ever, it is a “[s]ocietal myth [ ] that lip-reading will surmount any and
all communication difficulties that arise between deaf and nondeaf
persons. This simply is not true. . . . only about thirty percent of lan-
guage sounds are visible on the lips.”42 That means, only about thirty
percent of words can be understood by a skilled lip-reader.43 Generally
in “someone deafened postlingually [lip-reading] can be developed, but
for someone with limited English, it is an excruciating endeavor.”44
Hard of hearing typically refers to people who have mild-to-
moderate hearing loss.45 Hard of hearing individuals may better be
able to rely on hearing aids due to their lesser amount of hearing
loss.46 Hearing aids amplify sound but do not clarify it, therefore a
hearing aid must often be paired with lip-reading and the appropri-
ate conditions, to make speech intelligible.47 Furthermore, there is
another portion of the deaf community that is not fluent in any signed
or spoken language.48
While no two people with any disability are the same, the ex-
treme variation in methods of communication makes the deaf com-
munity particularly heterogeneous.49 This is critical when providing
guidelines for communication accommodations, as not all deaf peo-
ple will require the same tools or services;50some people who are
deaf might feel comfortable passing written notes while others
would require a certified ASL interpreter. In any particular instance
it is very likely that two deaf people would require very different
accommodations. This means a deaf person is often the only person
39. See id. at 207.
40. POTTERVELD, supra note 20, at x.
41. See Cassandra Shaw & Rhonda Buie, Why Parents of Deaf Children Don’t Learn
Sign Language, http://deafed.net/PublishedDocs/sub/970415y.htm [https://perma.cc/54
XC-9Z75].
42. McAlister, supra note 2, at 171–72.
43. Id. To demonstrate this point, say the words ‘pan’ and ban’ and consider how im-
possible it would be to visually distinguish between those words, especially if you had
no past exposure to how words sound.
44. Solomon, supra note 17.
45. See NAT’L ASS’N OF THE DEAF, supra note 16.
46. See Deafness and Hearing Loss, WHO (Mar. 2019), https://www.who.int/news
-room/fact-sheets/detail/deafness-and-hearing-loss [https://perma.cc/3BBF-29GZ].
47. See Abdallah, supra note 1, at 207.
48. See id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 206–07.
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who knows what they truly need to effectively communicate.51 Serious
investigation on the part of the official could result in effective com-
munication, but it is typically the best practice to defer to the request
of the person who is deaf.
II. THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT
Regardless of the Deaf community’s resistance to the label “dis-
abled”, the world is designed for hearing people, which makes func-
tioning in that world more difficult for people who are deaf.52 “[I]t is
hearing people’s gaze that determines reality. Within this reality
deaf people are disabled.”53 Therefore, without a change to society’s
conception of normalcy, the deaf community will continue to be con-
sidered disabled and will be entitled to the protections and accom-
modations which that classification affords.54
In 1990, Congress passed the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA), a comprehensive law designed to provide stronger antidis-
crimination protections for the disabled population.55 The ADA was
not a general prohibition of discrimination but provided tangible
and specific legal rights; therefore, it is considered one of the most
powerful pieces of civil rights legislation since the 1960s.56
More broadly, “[t]he ADA prohibits discrimination on the basis
of disability in employment, the provision of state and local govern-
ment services, places of public accommodations, commercial facili-
ties, transportation, and telecommunications.”57 For the purposes of
this Note, I will be focusing on Title II of the ADA, which requires
state and federal governments to ensure that disabled people have
the equal opportunity to benefit from all activities, programs, and
services offered by the government.58
The aim of Title II is to ensure that public officials and entities
prevent discrimination and provide appropriate accommodations to
people with disabilities.59 “Title II states that ‘no qualified individual
51. See McAlister, supra note 2, at 196.
52. Mary Ellen Maatman, Listening to Deaf Culture: A Reconceptualization of Difference
Analysis under Title VII, 13 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 269, 326 (1996).
53. Id. (quoting Leah H. Cohen, Train Go Sorry 208 (1994) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
54. See id. at 326.
55. See Sande Buhai & Nina Golden, Adding Insult to Injury: Discriminatory Intent
as a Prerequisite to Damages Under the ADA, 52 RUTGERS L. REV. 1121, 1122–23 (2000).
56. Id. at 1122.
57. Michael A. Schwartz, America’s Transformation: The Arc of Justice Bends Toward
the Deaf Community, 45 VAL. U.L. REV. 845, 852 (2011).
58. Id. at 853.
59. Andrew J. Lohmann, Arrests and Title II of The ADA: Framework of Claims for
Monetary Damages, 56 WASHBURN L.J. 559, 562–63 (2017).
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with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from
participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs,
or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by
any such entity.’ ”60 This Note will focus specifically on how the ADA
is intended to function in the criminal justice system, and the many
instances where the system fails to meet the standard set by the
ADA mandate with regard to the deaf population.61
Courts and police officers are both bound by the requirements
of Title II of the ADA, and therefore must ensure that their interac-
tions with people who are disabled are the same as their communi-
cations with the nondisabled population.62 It is in the legal system,
where clear communication is tantamount to justice, that the failures
to appropriately accommodate have the harshest repercussions.63
III. WHAT IS THE DEAF EXPERIENCE IN THE
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM LIKE?
From the first interaction with the police through the trial pro-
cess, and even through their time incarcerated, there are many in-
stances where a deaf person is denied accommodations and therefore
denied equal access to the justice system.64 This communication
barrier and unequal access leads to an increased number of people
who are deaf being denied a fair trial,65 falsely convicted, and falsely
imprisoned.66 “[E]ffective communication access to law enforcement
has been problematic for members of the Deaf community—victims,
witnesses, and suspects have trouble communicating with the
police—and traditional legal advocacy such as litigation has failed to
effectuate change beyond the specific parties involved in the crimi-
nal justice system.”67
Consistently ineffective communication with the police means
members of the deaf community are less likely to report crimes and
are more likely to be falsely arrested and face police brutality.68
60. Id.
61. See infra Part IV.
62. Laurence Paradis, Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act and Section 504
of the Rehabilitation Act: Making Programs, Services, and Activities Accessible to All, 14
STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 389, 395 (2003).
63. See McAlister, supra note 2, at 163–64.
64. Joint Committee on Access to the Courts, Improving the Access of Deaf and Hearing-
Impaired Litigants to the Justice System, 48 REC. ASS’N B. CITY N.Y. 834, 834 (1993).
65. See generally Kenneth S. Resnick & Eleanor M. Stromberg, The Rights of a
Hearing-Impaired Litigant, 8 OHIO LAW. 12 (1994).
66. See HEARD—HELPING EDUCATE TO ADVANCE THE RIGHTS OF DEAF COMMUNITIES,
https://behearddc.org [https://perma.cc/56SU-NWMB] [hereinafter HEARD].
67. Schwartz, supra note 57, at 853.
68. See McAnnany & Shah, supra note 3, at 876.
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While the ADA requires reasonable accommodations during judicial
proceedings, this does not always guarantee an interpreter.69 Many
law enforcement officers have likely never met a deaf person.70 In
“the bible of police interrogations,” there is no information on inter-
viewing people who are deaf.71 This means a deaf individual could,
and often does, spend their entire time in police custody without the
ability to understand what is happening and communicate their
wants and needs.72
False arrest is a common occurrence in the deaf community.73
Officers often perceive “a [deaf] person’s actions as suspicious, illegal,
or uncooperative.”74 For example, a deaf person’s speech patterns
might “sound slurred or unintelligible” and they might “have [a]
balanc[ing] problem . . . due to [an] inner ear condition[ ]”; this
might lead an officer to believe they are intoxicated.75 Alternatively,
an officer might believe a deaf person is ignoring their instructions
or resisting arrest.76
Police officers have a duty, under Title II, to ensure that their
communications with people who are deaf are as effective as com-
munications with others.77 Interpreters are not required for traffic
stops, arrests with probable cause, or stop-and-frisks; they are re-
quired if the officer reads the Miranda rights or conducts an inter-
view.78 The Miranda rights are a prime example of how a practice,
neutrally applied, can prejudicially effect a deaf person’s interaction
with the criminal justice system.
A. The Miranda Interpretation Problem
The decision in Miranda v. Arizona79 affirmed “the simple truth
that effective access to information regarding constitutional rights is
the absolute prerequisite to exercising those rights.”80 The Miranda
rights—familiar to all hearing people from their constant reiteration
in mainstream media—inform an individual of the right to remain
69. See Katrina R. Miller, Access to Sign Language Interpreters in the Criminal
Justice System, 146 AM. ANNALS DEAF 328, 329 (2001).
70. See POTTERVELD, supra note 20, at 15.
71. Id.
72. See Miller, supra note 69, at 329.
73. See HEARD, supra note 66.
74. POTTERVELD, supra note 20, at 16.
75. Id.
76. See id.
77. See id. at 20.
78. See id. at 18–23.
79. Arizona v. Miranda, 384 U.S. 436, 445 (1966).
80. McAlister, supra note 2, at 165.
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silent and the right to consult an attorney.81 Miranda warnings can
range from a fifth- to eleventh-grade reading level.82 A study of deaf
people educated until or beyond age 18 found 10% read at a tenth-
grade level, 60% read at a third- to fourth-grade level, and 33% read
at a 2.8-grade level.83
Many deaf people struggle to understand their Miranda rights
either written or even interpreted in ASL.84 “ASL is a visual language”
without a written equivalent, meaning a person who is deaf might
struggle to parse and understand the different grammatical struc-
ture of written English, because their language has no functional
equivalent.85 The meaning of this critical passage can be difficult to
convey even in ASL; for example, ASL has no sign for the word ‘right’
as it is used in the warning.86 While a certified interpreter could at-
tempt to convey the meaning through different words, there is a
significant risk that this warning, written for hearing people, will
not clearly translate into ASL.87
This exemplifies another barrier faced by deaf people in the crimi-
nal justice system. Most of hearing society could recite the Miranda
warnings solely from how often they have heard them said on TV,
but “many [d]eaf people have never encountered [them].”88 Deaf
people do not have the same access to incidental learning as hearing
people.89 Lack of exposure to media, conversations, and discussions
with hearing people create a gap in their supplemental understanding
of concepts that hearing society deems banal.90 This is especially true
of the criminal justice system, which all hearing people have at least
a passing comprehension of from TV alone.91 Most hearing people
would know, from their cultural background, that they have the right
to an attorney when being interviewed by the police.92 Deaf people,
lacking that same exposure, might not know they have that basic
right. Even if they do, they likely will not be given the tools neces-
sary to assert the right.
81. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 445.
82. See POTTERVELD, supra note 20, at 39.
83. Id. at 43.
84. See McAnnany & Shah, supra note 3, at 881–82.
85. POTTERVELD, supra note 20, at 55.
86. Id. at 43.
87. Id. at 55–56.
88. Id. at 50.
89. See, e.g., id. at 54–55. Hearing the Miranda rights repeated on every police or
lawyer TV show is an example of the kind of incidental learning that people who are deaf
are not exposed to.
90. Id. at 55.
91. POTTERVELD, supra note 20, at 50.
92. Id. at 49–50.
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B. Interpreting
In Updike v. Multnomah County,93 the specific case before the
Court, it is being asserted that written notes were as effective as an
interpreter would have been, yet the nature of sign language makes
that untrue.94 The meaning of words in sign language can depend
exclusively on the facial expression of the signer, and incredible em-
phasis can be conveyed through sign that cannot be communicated
through written words.95 This means that ASL or another signed
method of communication is often the preferred method of communica-
tion for people who are deaf, even if they are able to read and write.96
Often, interpreting in a legal setting requires expansion of the
language to ensure accurate understanding.97 Interpreters have a
duty to ensure that a deaf suspect understands their constitutional
rights before allowing the suspect to waive those rights in a police
interview.98 Interpreters have the authority to “use linguistic expan-
sion to ‘make meaning explicit from something inherently implicit.’”99
This requires an understanding of Deaf Culture and the background
of the individual. For this reason, a CODA (Child of Deaf Adult100)
often makes the best interpreter of both language and culture.101
However, an interpreter is required to convey information impartially,
which a family member often finds impossible to do.102 Family mem-
bers also lack the legal training needed to interpret these special-
ized legal concepts in an effective matter.103 Therefore, courts are
required to maintain a list of certified interpreters, although the
decision to supply an interpreter remains solely at the discretion of
the judge and his understanding of the needs of the deaf person.104
93. See Updike v. Multnomah Cty., 870 F.3d 939, 949, 944, 955 (9th Cir. 2017), cert.
denied, 139 S. Ct. 55 (2018).
94. See Abdallah, supra note 1, at 207–08.
95. See Arika Okrent, Why Great Sign Language Interpreters Are So Animated,
ATLANTIC (Nov. 2, 2012), https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2012/11/why-great
-sign-language-interpreters-are-so-animated/264459 [https://perma.cc/PAZ7-A3GZ].
96. See Solomon, supra note 17.
97. See POTTERVELD, supra note 20, at 55.
98. See id. at 50–51.
99. Id.
100. Children of Deaf Adults (CODA), DEAF WEBSITES, http://www.deafwebsites.com
/children/children-of-deaf-adults.html [https://perma.cc/SFN9-2FJC]. CODAs have not
only been interpreting for their parents for most of their lives, but because they grew up
surrounded by both hearing and Deaf Culture, they can better interpret concepts that
do not clearly translate from hearing to Deaf culture.
101. See id.
102. See Abdallah, supra note 1, at 208.
103. See id.
104. See id. at 210–11.
462 WM. & MARY J. RACE, GENDER & SOC. JUST.              [Vol. 26:451
C. A Review of the Deaf Experience
To summarize, for a large portion of the deaf population, deafness
is not defined only as an audiological malfunction or a disability, but
as a basis for membership in a rich and unique culture and commu-
nity.105 Deaf people are not homogeneous; their experiences and
their preferred methods of communication vary, some speak English
while others use ASL, some are comfortable communicating with
written English while others are not.106 Therefore, the appropriate
accommodation for one person who is deaf is oftentimes not the
correct accommodation for another person who is deaf.107 Regardless
of their preferred method of accommodation, people who are deaf
should be the ones tasked with determining what accommodation is
best for them, be it a live interpreter or a pen and paper. Their pre-
ferred accommodation is of the utmost importance when interacting
with the criminal justice system. Often the police officer or judge is
not only unfamiliar with the experience of the individual before them,
but likely has never met a deaf person before.108 Clearly, they should
not be tasked with deciding what accommodation should be provided;
this was the issue presented in the case submitted to the United
States Supreme Court.109
IV. UPDIKE V. MULTNOMAH COUNTY
The case submitted to the United States Supreme Court, Updike
v. Multnomah County, arose out of the Ninth Circuit.110 The plaintiff,
David Updike, was born deaf, and his primary language is ASL; he
does not consider himself to be bilingual in English.111 His claim
against the County arose from a three-day stay in the County deten-
tion center and jail in response to an alleged domestic disturbance.112
Although the arresting officer knew the reported disturbance
involved deaf individuals, an ASL interpreter was not present dur-
ing the arrest.113 Despite the fact that the detention center had a
105. See Solomon, supra note 17.
106. See Abdallah, supra note 1, at 207.
107. See id. at 206–07.
108. See Amiel Fields-Meyer, When Police Officers Don’t Know About the ADA, ATLAN-
TIC (Sept. 26, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/09/the-steadily
-problematic-interactions-between-deaf-americans-and-police/541083 [https://perma.cc
/L4NT-GFQ2].
109. See Updike v. Multnomah Cty., 870 F.3d 939, 951, 954–55, 958 (9th Cir. 2017),
cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 55 (2018).
110. Id. at 939.
111. Id. at 943.
112. Id. at 943–45.
113. Id. at 943.
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telecommunications device for the deaf (TDD) and a contract with
an interpreting service, Updike’s requests for each of these accom-
modations during booking were denied, and he was forced to attempt
to read the officer’s lips.114 Updike was presented with written witness
statements and told to write down his version of events.115
Twice while in holding, Updike requested a teletypewriter (TTY)
to call his mother and attorney; he also requested an interpreter,
and a piece of paper.116 None of these requests were accommodated.117
Updike had a meeting with the nurse, and once again requested an
interpreter, as he was hoping to explain to the nurse that the offi-
cers had hurt his neck and back during the arrest.118 The nurse did
not solicit an interpreter, despite his request.119 As a result, Updike
was unable to communicate the pain in his neck and back to the
nurse, and she did not examine those areas.120
Before being transferred to the jail, Updike asked two other
officers for a TTY and an interpreter, to no avail.121 During his next
two days in jail, all of Updike’s requests for a TTY were denied.122
His arraignment was delayed a day because an interpreter was not
present.123 This was a costly mistake, as he spent another night in
jail.124 Only during the arraignment was Updike accommodated with
an interpreter, and only after being released was he allowed access
to a TTY to call his daughter to pick him up.125
A. The Appellate Court’s Decision
The appellate court affirmed the district court’s determination
that the failure to have an interpreter at the first arraignment was
114. Id. at 943–44.
115. Updike, 870 F.3d at 944.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Updike, 870 F.3d at 944–45.
122. Id. at 945. Nowhere in the record did the court explain any administrative or fi-
nancial reasons for why these accommodations were denied. This leads to the assumption
that the actions were discriminatory in nature. Unfortunately, this is not an anomaly.
In a study of 22 criminal justice proceedings including deaf defendants a researcher
found that in 40.9% of arrests law enforcement officials used only spoken English and
provided no accommodation at all. 22.7% of deaf suspects had to communicate through
a family member, friend, or law enforcement employee. 13.6% were interrogated through
written notes, and only 13.6% were provided professional interpreters. Miller, supra note
69, at 329.
123. Updike, 870 F.3d at 945.
124. Id.
125. Id.
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negligent, not deliberate.126 They cite another Ninth Circuit case,
Duvall v. County of Kitsap, to solidify this rule: “a failure to act must
be a result of conduct that is more than negligent, and involves an
element of deliberateness.”127 The appellate court did not concur
with the district court’s dismissal of the requests Updike made during
processing and while in jail.128
The Ninth Circuit reasoned that the County’s notice of his need
for an accommodation and their deliberate denial of that accommo-
dation, could lead a trier of fact to conclude that the County acted
with deliberate indifference, and that those requested accommoda-
tions were “necessary for effective communication.”129 The same issue
of fact was present in his interaction with the nurse and the other
officers.130 Because of these questions of facts, the appellate court
reversed summary judgement on Updike’s claim for damages, thus
sending the case to trial, where the factual contentions could be
fully explored and litigated.131
A determinative fact in the court’s decision was the failure of
the County to investigate what accommodations might be appropri-
ate for Updike: “the County introduced no evidence that it ascer-
tained what accommodations might be needed, and instead relie[d]
on self-serving observations that its employees believed they were
effectively communicating with Updike.”132 As it follows, one of the
main disputes in this case is who shall make the determination of
what accommodations are appropriate: the person requesting the
accommodation or the person supplying it.133 The Ninth Circuit
determined that “[i]f the public entity does not defer to the deaf
individual’s request, then the burden is on the entity to demonstrate
that another effective means of communication exists or that the
requested auxiliary aid would otherwise not be required.”134
B. The Debate over the Correct Standard
In the Petition for Writ of Certiorari, the petitioner argued that
the Ninth Circuit’s two-pronged test, requiring notice and a deliberate
failure to act, is too low a standard.135 They believed this test was
not a substantial enough hurdle and would require the government
126. Id. at 952.
127. Id. at 951–52.
128. Updike, 870 F.3d at 955.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 956.
131. Id. at 958.
132. Id. at 956.
133. Updike, 870 F.3d at 951, 954–55, 958.
134. Id. at 958.
135. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 13, at 24–25.
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to grant a person’s first-choice accommodation regardless of the cost.136
Admittedly, the first prong of the standard is easily satisfied:
When the plaintiff has alerted the public entity to his need for
accommodation (or where the need for accommodation is obvi-
ous, or required by statute or regulation), the public entity is on
notice that an accommodation is required, and the plaintiff has
satisfied the first element of the deliberate indifference test.137
Petitioner claims the second prong is satisfied in any instance when
a plaintiff is not granted their first-choice accommodation; “[i]f the
entity does not provide the plaintiff’s first-choice accommodation—a
fact common to every lawsuit challenging a public entity’s provision
of reasonable accommodation—it has made a deliberate choice,
satisfying the second prong of deliberate indifference.”138
Although the standard used by the Ninth Circuit is not used
universally, all circuits agree that in order to recover compensatory
damages under the ADA, a plaintiff must prove some level of dis-
criminatory intent.139 This requirement exists because the remedial
scheme of the ADA was derived from Section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act, which was derived from Title VI,140 which was enacted through
Congress’s Spending Power.141 Because of the structure of this law,
in order for a government defendant to be liable for monetary dam-
ages under Title II, the plaintiff must prove the defendants were on
notice that they were violating the law.142 Discriminatory intent
satisfies the notice requirement, and without a showing of discrimi-
natory intent, a plaintiff cannot recover compensatory damages.143
C. Petitioner’s Position
The petitioner argued that the existence of two different stan-
dards for intentional discrimination warranted the Court’s review.144
Arguably, three circuits—the First,145 Fifth146 and Sixth147—believe
136. Id. at 25.
137. Updike, 870 F.3d at 950–51.
138. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 13, at 19.
139. Id. at 6.
140. See Nina Golden, Compounding the Error: “Deliberate Indifference” vs. “Discrimina-
tory Animus” Under Title II of the ADA, 23 N. ILL. U.L. REV. 227, 230 (2003).
141. Id. at 233.
142. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 13, at 14.
143. Id. at 6.
144. Id. at i, 1–2.
145. See, e.g., Schultz v. YMCA of the United States, 139 F.3d 286, 291 (1st Cir. 1998).
146. See, e.g., Delano-Pyle v. Victoria Cty., 302 F.3d 567, 575–76 (5th Cir. 2002).
147. See, e.g., Anderson v. City of Blue Ash, 798 F.3d 338, 356–57 (6th Cir. 2015).
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the discriminatory intent standard should be animus, and five
circuits—the Eighth,148 Eleventh,149 Tenth,150 Ninth,151 and Third152—
believe the appropriate standard is deliberate indifference.153 Peti-
tioner further claims the interpretation of deliberate indifference
varies circuit to circuit.154 The petitioner lays out their understand-
ing of the three circuits’ applications of what they define as the
animus standard.155
1. The First Circuit
The petitioner contends that the First Circuit requires a showing
of animus in order to recover for emotional distress.156 The peti-
tioner points to Schultz v. YMCA of the United States157 where a deaf
lifeguard’s YMCA certification was revoked because of his refusal to
wear a hearing aid at all times.158 The court refused to grant dam-
ages and claimed that “an award of damages for emotional distress,
in a debatable case on the merits with no animus or other concrete
impact, strikes us as a distortion of remedial relief.”159
This is both narrow and vague; the court elaborates on its under-
standing of the standard in Carmona-Rivera v. Puerto Rico.160 Peti-
tioner claims that this case made a showing of animus a requirement
to recover for emotional distress.161 The respondent contends that
this is an overstatement of the case’s holding, which stated a plaintiff
could recover non-economic damages by showing animus or economic
harm.162 The plaintiff in the case, and in Schultz—where the animus
standard was first proposed—was only unable to recover because
they were not seeking economic damages, and therefore had to
make a showing of animus.163 This is not the situation in Updike v.
148. See, e.g., Meagley v. City of Little Rock, 639 F.3d 384, 389–90 (8th Cir. 2011).
149. See, e.g., Liese v. Indian River Cty. Hosp. Dist., 701 F.3d 334, 345 (11th Cir. 2012).
150. See, e.g., Barber v. Colorado, 562 F.3d 1222, 1228–29 (10th Cir. 2009).
151. See, e.g., Duvall v. Cty. of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, 1138 (9th Cir. 2001).
152. See, e.g., Chisolm v. McManimon, 275 F.3d 315, 318, 327–28 (3d Cir. 2001) (revers-
ing District Court’s grant of summary judgment to a detention center that denied a deaf
inmate’s request for accommodations because there was a genuine issue of material fact
regarding the effectiveness of alternative aids provided).
153. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 13, at 10–11.
154. Id. at 10–13.
155. Id. at 11–12.
156. Id. at 11.
157. Id.
158. Schultz v. YMCA of the United States, 139 F.3d 286, 288 (1st Cir. 1998).
159. Id. at 287–88, 291.
160. Carmona-Rivera v. Puerto Rico, 464 F.3d 14, 17 (1st Cir. 2006).
161. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 13, at 11.
162. Brief in Opposition at 15, Multnomah v. Updike, 139 S. Ct. 55 (2018) (No. 17-1222).
163. Id. at 15–16.
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Multnomah County, where the plaintiff “sought compensatory dam-
ages, injunctive relief, and attorneys’ fees and costs.”164
2. The Fifth Circuit
Petitioner claims deliberate indifference was deemed insuffi-
cient in the Fifth Circuit’s case Delano-Pyle v. Victoria County.165 In
this case, a deaf individual was instructed by a police officer to do
three sobriety tests, even though the police officer knew the plaintiff
was deaf and could not hear the commands.166 When the plaintiff
failed to perform the tests as instructed, he was arrested.167 The
police officer testified he did not know if the plaintiff had understood
the instructions for the tests or his Miranda warnings.168 The plain-
tiff was then interrogated and verbally asked six times until he
agreed to consent to a blood test.169
Respondent argues that the court did not apply an animus
standard or reject deliberate indifference in this case.170 It did not
articulate a standard at all; instead, the Court only recognized that
a showing of intentional discrimination was required.171 In this case,
with facts very similar to those in Updike, the court found that the
police intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff, without
requiring any evidence of animus.172
In a subsequent case, proffered by the petitioner, the court de-
clined to find a college’s denial of a student’s request to take tests
two weeks after the other students to be intentionally discrimina-
tory.173 “When the record is ‘devoid of evidence of malice, ill-will, or
efforts . . . to impede’ a disabled student’s progress, summary judg-
ment must be granted in favor of the university.”174 Again, the
respondent reads this conclusion narrowly, arguing here that the
court only looks for malice in the specific instance of a university’s
decision not to alter a program and is not generally defining the
intent standard for intentional discrimination.175
164. Updike v. Multnomah Cty., 870 F.3d 939, 946 (9th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 139
S. Ct. 55 (2018).
165. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 13, at 12.
166. Delano-Pyle v. Victoria Cty., 302 F.3d 567, 570 (5th Cir. 2002).
167. Id. at 570–71.
168. Id. at 571.
169. Id.
170. Brief in Opposition, supra note 162, at 11.
171. Delano-Pyle, 302 F.3d at 575.
172. Brief in Opposition, supra note 162, at 12.
173. Campbell v. Lamar Inst. of Tech., 842 F.3d 375, 377 (5th Cir. 2016).
174. Id. at 380.
175. Brief in Opposition, supra note 162, at 13.
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3. The Sixth Circuit
The respondent asserts that the petitioner’s conclusion that the
Sixth Circuit applies an animus standard is similarly misguided.176
In Anderson v. City of Blue Ash, the court found that evidence of
animus against a protected group is necessary to prevail under a
disparate treatment claim; a lack of animus did not prevent recovery
on a failure to accommodate claim.177 Therefore, a plaintiff in this
circuit can recover compensatory damages under Title II without a
showing of animus.178
D. Respondent’s Argument
Respondent rejects petitioner’s assertion that there is a split in
the understanding and application of the intentional discrimination
requirement.179 The Supreme Court’s denial of certiorari implies
they too believe there is no split in the standard that needs to be
rectified.180 Respondent claims that even if each circuit has not ex-
pressly adopted the deliberate indifference standard, no circuit re-
quires evidence of animus to recover compensatory damages.181 The
following circuits have affirmatively adopted deliberate indifference
as the appropriate standard.182 These circuits look for a “defendant’s
deliberate indifference to the strong likelihood that pursuit of its
questioned policies will likely result in a violation of federally pro-
tected rights.”183
1. The Eight Circuit
In the Eighth Circuit case, Meagley v. City of Little Rock, the
plaintiff was injured when her motorized scooter tipped over while
attempting to cross a footbridge at the zoo.184 After the accident, the
zoo discovered the slopes of the footbridges exceeded the limit stated
176. Id. at 13–14.
177. Brief in Opposition, supra note 162, at 13–14 (citing Anderson v. City of Blue Ash,
798 F.3d 338, 356–57 (6th Cir. 2015)).
178. Id.
179. Brief in Opposition, supra note 162, at 11.
180. Updike v. Multnomah Cty., 870 F.3d 939 (9th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct.
55 (2018).
181. Brief in Opposition, supra note 162, at 11.
182. See, e.g., Liese v. Indian River Cty. Hosp. Dist., 701 F.3d 334, 345 (11th Cir.
2012); Meagley v. City of Little Rock, 639 F.3d 384, 389–90 (8th Cir. 2011); Barber v.
Colorado, 562 F.3d 1222, 1228–29 (10th Cir. 2009); Duvall v. Cty. Of Kitsap, 260 F.3d
1124, 1138 (9th Cir. 2001).
183. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 13, at 13 (citing Meagley v. City of
Little Rock, 639 F.3d 384, 389 (8th Cir. 2011)).
184. Meagley, 639 at 386–87.
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in the ADA guidelines.185 However, the plaintiff did not succeed in
establishing deliberate indifference, because the zoo was not on notice
that its bridges were not in compliance with the ADA.186 When a
plaintiff fails to establish notice, an inquiry in the deliberateness of
the action or inaction is not required.187 This case rebuts petitioner’s
contention that the deliberate indifference standard is too low.188 A
plaintiff still must show the defendant was on notice, and without
notice they will not prevail.189
2. The Eleventh Circuit
In Liese v. Indian River County Hospital District, the Eleventh
Circuit adopted deliberate indifference as the proper standard for
proving intentional discrimination.190 The case arose when two deaf
individuals were unable to effectively communicate at an emergency
room.191 They filed a claim for compensatory damages, claiming the
hospital’s repeated denial of an ASL interpreter entitled them to
damages under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.192 The patient
was examined and received emergency surgery without access to an
interpreter; all communication was through lip-reading and written
notes.193 The court found these accommodations to be insufficient,
relying mostly on the plaintiff’s assertion that she had very little
understanding of what was happening to her.194
The court determined that a reasonable jury could find that the
doctors were on notice of plaintiff’s need for an interpreter, had the
authority to get her one, and failed to do so with deliberate indiffer-
ence.195 “His apparent knowledge that Liese required an additional
interpretive aid to effectively communicate with him and his delib-
erate refusal to provide that aid satisfies the deliberate indifference
standard.”196
185. Id. at 387.
186. Id. at 389.
187. Id.
188. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 13, at 24–25.
189. Id. at 6.
190. Liese v. Indian River Cty. Hosp. Dist., 701 F.3d 334, 345 (11th Cir. 2012).
191. Id. at 336.
192. Id. The Rehabilitation Act has the same remedial scheme as the ADA, they are
governed by the same legal standard. “The ADA enlarges the scope of the Rehabilitation
Act to cover private employers, but the legislative history of the ADA indicates that Con-
gress intended judicial interpretation of the Rehabilitation Act to be incorporated by
reference when interpreting the ADA.” Nielsen v. Moroni Feed Co., 162 F.3d 604, 608 n.7
(10th Cir. 1998).
193. Liese, 701 F.3d at 343.
194. Id. at 344.
195. Id. at 351.
196. Id.
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This case can be contrasted with Martin v. Halifax Healthcare
System, where plaintiffs’ claims of insufficient accommodations in a
hospital setting did not overcome the deliberate indifference stan-
dard.197 In this case, three separate plaintiffs argued that the failure
of the hospital to provide “continuous live interpreting services” for
the duration of their stay entitled them to compensatory damages.198
The court found that in order to recover, the plaintiffs would need
to demonstrate that “hospital staff knew there was a substantial likeli-
hood that they would be unable to communicate effectively absent an
interpreter, but still made a ‘deliberate choice’ not to provide one.”199
However, before a showing of deliberate indifference was required,
a plaintiff would need to offer evidence that the defendants failed to
provide appropriate accommodations.200
The court concluded, under the facts presented, that each plain-
tiff was provided appropriate aids to facilitate communication during
their emergency situations.201 These ranged from live interpreters,
remote interpreting, family interpreting, written notes and gestures.202
They emphasize that one of the plaintiffs never claimed he was un-
able to understand the written notes.203
3. The Tenth Circuit
The Tenth Circuit also applies the deliberate indifference stan-
dard.204 In Barber v. Colorado, the court found that the defendant’s
provision of a reasonable accommodation was not considered delib-
erately indifferent solely because the plaintiff had requested some-
thing else.205 The plaintiff was requesting an exception to a statute
based on her disability.206 The statute at issue required a guardian
with a valid license to supervise their child’s driving until they turned
sixteen.207 The plaintiff who is blind, and therefore cannot hold a valid
license, requested an exception that would allow the child’s grandfa-
ther to supervise her.208 The DMV’s alternative accommodation in-
volved the plaintiff’s father becoming a guardian to the child, as this
197. Martin v. Halifax Healthcare Sys., 621 Fed. App’x 594, 596, 604 (11th Cir. 2015).
198. Id. at 596, 599.
199. Id. at 604.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 603.
202. Id. at 598.
203. Martin, 621 Fed. App’x at 602.
204. Powers v. MJB Acquisition Corp., 184 F.3d 1147, 1153 (10th Cir. 1999).
205. Barber v. Colorado, 562 F.3d 1222, 1232 (10th Cir. 2009).
206. Id. at 1226.
207. Id. at 1225.
208. Id.
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would accommodate the request without requiring a change to the
language of the statute.209
The Tenth Circuit found the DMV had not acted with indiffer-
ence toward the plaintiff’s disability and had offered an alternative
accommodation which was all together reasonable.210
To uphold the Barbers’ claim for compensatory damages, we would
necessarily need to hold that an institution’s rejection of any re-
quested accommodation, even when other reasonable options
that are more acceptable to the institution are available, results
per se in deliberate indifference. The mere fact that the DMV did
not accept Marcia Barber’s suggested resolution does not estab-
lish a deliberate indifference to her situation or her rights.211
This is starkly at odds with the conclusion the Ninth Circuit came
to, yet the Tenth Circuit concedes this is an unusual case.212 The facts
in most of the cases above are significantly different than the ones
facing the Ninth Circuit.
4. The Ninth Circuit
The Ninth Circuit found deliberate indifference to be the correct
standard in Duvall v. County of Kitsap.213 In Duvall, the court ex-
plained its reasoning, asserting that the deliberate indifference stan-
dard “is better suited to the remedial goals of Title II of the ADA than
is the discriminatory animus alternative.”214
The test applied by the Ninth Circuit demands a showing that
the defendant was on notice that the accommodation is required and
that the defendant’s failure to supply that accommodation was not
simply negligent, but involved “an element of deliberateness.”215 A
defendant also has a duty to gather information from the person
making the request and hire experts to help in their determination
of what accommodations are necessary.216
The Ninth Circuit expanded on its understanding of deliberate
indifference in Updike v. Multnomah County.217 Relying on the ADA
209. Id. at 1230.
210. Id.
211. Barber, 562 F.3d at 1232.
212. Id. at 1230.
213. Duvall v. Cty. of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, 1138 (9th Cir. 2001).
214. Id. at 1139.
215. Id. at 1138–40.
216. Id. at 1139.
217. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 13, at 8.
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implementation regulations, the court concluded that a presumption
of deliberate indifference is created when a plaintiff’s first choice
accommodation is denied.218 The petitioner considers this to be too
weak a rule and claims a reliance on the plaintiff’s own understanding
of his needs should not be sufficient.219 Yet the Ninth Circuit justified
this decision by quoting the language of the appendix of the ADA:
The public entity shall honor the choice [of the individual with a
disability] unless it can demonstrate that another effective means
of communication exists or that use of the means chosen would
not be required under § 35.164. Deference to the request of the
individual with a disability is desirable because of the range of
disabilities, the variety of auxiliary aids and services, and differ-
ent circumstances requiring effective communication.220
It seems well within the intended purpose of the ADA for a public
entity to defer to a disabled individual’s understanding of the appro-
priate accommodation.221 If they choose not to honor that request,
they carry the burden of showing that accommodation is not re-
quired and establishing that another accommodation is as effective.222
V. THE BEST STANDARD FOR THE DEAF COMMUNITY
The Ninth Circuit’s justification223 fits perfectly when it comes to
ensuring access to communication for members of the deaf community
as they interact with the criminal justice system. In the analysis
above, we have seen numerous instances when a police officer, a judge,
or other powerful city official decided that their determination of the
needs of a deaf person was the correct determination. That falls out-
side the mandate from the ADA, for which the intended purpose is:
(1) to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the
elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabili-
ties; (2) to provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards
addressing discrimination against individuals with disabilities;(3)
to ensure that the Federal Government plays a central role in
218. Id.
219. Id. at 9
220. Updike v. Multnomah Cty., 870 F.3d 939, 950 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting pt. 35, App.
A (alteration in original)) (quoting 28 C.F.R. pt. 35, App. A (2009)).
221. See id.
222. Updike, 870 F.3d at 958.
223. See Updike, 870 F.3d at 950 (quoting pt. 35, App. A (alteration in original)) (quoting
28 C.F.R. pt. 35, App. A (2009)).
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enforcing the standards established in this Act on behalf of indi-
viduals with disabilities . . . .224
These officials are charged with the task of providing the best avail-
able accommodation; it seems contrary to that purpose to refuse the
first-choice accommodation of the person whose disability is meant
to be fairly accommodated. This denial is even more egregious in
cases where the required accommodation—an interpreter, a TDD, or
even a piece of paper—is readily available, yet is still being denied.
That is clearly discriminatory and cannot be the accurate function
of this protective statute.
The Ninth Circuit correctly interpreted the proper standard that
should be applied uniformly in all cases of denied accommodation.
When a person’s first choice accommodation is denied, the burden
falls on the shoulders of the government, and a denial of a request
without a subsequent investigation into the proper method of ac-
commodation is enough to survive summary judgment.225 This does
not mean that every deaf person will be entitled to an ASL inter-
preter for every moment of their interaction with the criminal jus-
tice system. What it means is this: if the government chooses to deny
the person’s first choice an accommodation, it will be required to do
the necessary investigation into what would be a reasonable alter-
native accommodation.226
This process is beneficial not only because it takes into account
the vast differences in deaf communication, but also because it forces
the government, if it chooses not to defer to the requested accommo-
dation, to become familiar with the different methods of communica-
tion and the experiences of the person in its custody.227 If there is a
truly equal alternative, the government is free to choose it.228 How-
ever, often the burden on the government will be lessened, and the
outcome for the individual will be improved, by deferring to the in-
dividual’s understanding of their own needs.229 By being given the
duty to educate itself on the circumstances and abilities of the people
who are disabled that the government encounters, over time this
interpretation might create a more informed and unbiased system
that can better serve the needs of all members of our diverse society,
thus meeting the objective of the ADA.230
224. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1)–(3) (2009).
225. Updike, 870 F.3d at 954.
226. Id. at 958.
227. See id.
228. See id.
229. See id. at 958.
230. See id.
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VI. CONCERNS OVER ADOPTING THIS STANDARD
It is clear that in order to serve the intended purpose of the ADA,
a person’s accommodation preference should be the default, especially
when interacting with the criminal justice system. Why, then, has
this standard not been adopted throughout the country? The reasons
range from a lack of political will to a deep-seated and stealthy preju-
dice in the nation’s perception of the differently abled.231 While these
two obstacles have prevented forward movement, and even jeopar-
dized existing protections, disability advocates have banded together
to defend their right to individual autonomy and protection under the
law.232 With new invigoration motivated by these real and substantial
threats to their existence, a new movement is forming and resisting
in significant and visible ways.233
A. Current Political Climate
It is evident that the current political landscape does not lend
itself to broadening protections and rights afforded to the disabled
population.234 President Trump has not only openly mocked Americans
with disabilities, but plans to re-erect the wall that the ADA tore
down—a wall separating people with disabilities from true and equal
access.235 It is hard to imagine any substantive achievements for the
disabled community under the leadership of a president who openly
ridiculed them, calling Paralympic athletes “a little tough to watch”
and mockingly imitating a physically disabled reporter.236 His igno-
rance and bigotry have a powerful impact; not only do these instances
231. See Leadership Conference, There’s a Disability Rights Treaty. The United States
Still Hasn’t Ratified it, MEDIUM (Mar. 30, 2017), https://medium.com/@civilrightsorg
/theres-a-disability-rights-treaty-the-united-states-still-hasn-t-ratified-it-370750457d72
[https://perma.cc/TX7L-XEBF].
232. ADAPT, Disability Organizing 101 and Beyond, http://freeourpeople.net/disability
organizing101andbeyond/ [https://perma.cc/NAK2-R7BT]; National Association of the Deaf,
Law and Advocacy Center, https://www.nad.org/about-us/law-advocacy-center [https://
perma.cc/MPS5-828T].
233. See Abigail Abrams, ‘Our Lives Are at Stake.’ How Donald Trump Inadvertently
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normalize and propagate such outrageous conduct, but they further
ostracize the general public from this stigmatized community.237
The President’s behavior is not his only method of endangering
this portion of the population; the administration has been actively
diminishing the progress made in disability rights and threatening the
lives of disabled people across the country.238 By repealing the Individ-
ual Mandate in the Affordable Care Act (ACA), the current adminis-
tration has left millions of disabled Americans without healthcare,
making this issue truly one of life or death.239 Efforts to undermine
Medicaid similarly, negatively, and disproportionally affected Amer-
ica’s disabled community, as “Medicaid is the primary health insurer”
for people with disabilities.240 These consistently proposed cuts could
bring an end to Medicaid-funded personal-care attendants and in-
home services, which would effectively strip people with disabilities
of their autonomy and even force them into institutions, thus “con-
demning them to a life of limited freedom.”241
The administration is also attempting to undercut the protection
provided by the ADA.242 House Resolution 620,the ADA Education
and Reform Act of 2017,”would force a disabled person to first file a
notice that usually requires counsel, wait 60 days for a response and
wait 120 more days to see if progress is made on remedying a violation
of the law before the issue can be brought to the courts.”243 This Act
will impose even more barriers to justice for people with disabilities.244
Sara Novic, a Deaf author, explained the fear this bill incited in her:
Under H.R. 620, a business could legally wait a minimum of six
months as they “make progress” toward hiring an interpreter, cap-
tioning content or installing visual alarm systems—essentially
rendering Deaf people like me powerless in the interim. And this
is just one of the many far-reaching implications of the bill.245
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The proffered purpose of the bill is to protect businesses from frivolous
lawsuits, but because there are no monetary damages awarded under
these Title III lawsuits, it seems the framers’ true agenda is not to
prevent lawsuits but to delay them and deny people the opportunity
to vindicate their rights.246 It is unsurprising that this bill has gained
such quick support in the current Congress,247 and with a president
whose personal businesses have been sued eight times for violations
of the ADA.248
Similar attempts to cripple the ADA have been orchestrated by
the Department of Justice, the very agency responsible for its en-
forcement.249 Former Attorney General Jeff Sessions withdrew guid-
ance documents requiring states to promote employment opportunities
for people with disabilities and pending documents relating to how
the ADA applies to websites, something disability advocates had
been pushing to be passed for years.250 These revocations generate
confusion on the application of the law, which can result in dimin-
ished enforcement.251
The human rights of people with disabilities are being attacked
from all political sides, so it is imperative that we have the courts
looking out for these attempts to subvert the advancements made in
disability rights.252 The Ninth Circuit—referred to by Rush Limbaugh
as the “Ninth Circus”—is often considered a wild and liberal bastion
that, according to Newt Gingrich, ought to be abolished.253 However,
in reality it has been growing more conservative, thanks to Reagan
and Bush appointments.254 Despite its reputation as an activist court,
the Ninth Circuit is not, in fact, the most consistently overturned
court on appeal and is often a force in progressive jurisprudence.255
B. American Normative Conception of Disability
Of course it is easy, but not accurate, to place the blame only on
those in charge. Society has never been motivated to fight this specific
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fight.256 This is possibly due to the disabled community being less
visible and more stigmatized than other marginalized groups.257 The
growing grassroots movements often seek to erase the pity and stigma
perceived by the general population as they campaign for equality.258
When President Bush signed the ADA, he celebrated the enact-
ment, claiming the “passage has made the United States the inter-
national leader on this human rights issue.”259 While that might
have been true at the time, the international community has taken
strides that have left the United States in the dust.260 In 2012, the
U.S. Congress refused to ratify The Convention on the Rights of People
with Disabilities (CRPD), despite the fact that the United Nations
(U.N.) had modeled it after the ADA.261 While President Obama signed
the treaty in 2009, it has been routinely rejected by a nervous Con-
gress.262 It seems illogical for the United States to refuse to ratify a
treaty its high standards inspired, but the CPDR takes certain rights
farther than the U.S. is comfortable with.263 Article 12 of the Conven-
tion is an example of an article that surpasses what our country is
comfortable awarding its disabled citizens.264 This Article considers
recognition of people with disabilities before the law stating: “Parties
shall recognize that persons with disabilities enjoy legal capacity on an
equal basis with others in all aspects of life.”265 This contradicts Amer-
ica’s commitment to the paternal treatment of its disabled population.
While it might not have seemed critical for the U.S. to ratify this
treaty in 2012, it seems much more crucial in our current political
climate.266 Our reluctance to ratify this treaty is based in our reluc-
tance as a nation to recognize the ability of those we classify as
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disabled.267 This stigma and notion of permanent helplessness under-
mines not only our perceptions of people with disabilities, but also
our society’s treatment of them.268 The theory of this Note is based
on the understanding that a deaf person, and any disabled person,
has the competence to discern their own needs. However, the most
popular interpretation of the ADA gives the power to discern their
needs to someone else.269 Our country will not be able to accept the
Ninth Circuit’s understanding of the ADA until we can join the
world community in its recognition of the capacity of people with dis-
abilities to determine their own needs. Our job, and the intention of
the ADA, should not be to tell people with disabilities what they need,
but to provide them what they need to have access equal to ours.
C. Current Momentum
While our political situation is disheartening, and the miscon-
ceptions about ability are deeply engrained, this cause is not with-
out hope or promise. The fight on the political field is far from over;
in fact, it has been reinvigorated.270 “What [Trump] doesn’t seem to
realize is that Americans with disabilities and our families are a
powerful force that will fight back when he mocks or marginalizes.”271
While the current administration can work to undermine the rights of
the disabled community, there are other methods to make substan-
tial and necessary change.272 Social activism in the disabled commu-
nity has erupted as individuals and organizations grow increasingly
conscious of their political identity and demand recognition.273
We have seen this in action in the fight to preserve the ACA.274
ADAPT, a grassroots disability civil rights organization, increased visi-
bility and showed their resistance “by staging ‘die-ins’ in U.S. con-
gressional offices.”275 They averaged three protests per day in thirty
states in an effort to retain the ACA—an issue that, for them, can
mean life or death.276 Their tag line—“Piss on Pity”—acknowledges
the capacity and power the disabled community possesses.277 These
disability activists are coming together and refusing to be dismissed,
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268. See id.
269. See Das, supra note 239.
270. See Hung & Perez, supra note 234.
271. Id.
272. See Abrams, supra note 233.
273. See id.
274. See Das, supra note 239.
275. Id.
276. Abrams, supra note 233.
277. ADAPT—Free Our People, The Story of ADAPT Trailer, https://adapt.org/the
-story-of-adapt-trailer [https://perma.cc/L9NR-ETC9].
2020] THE BLIND LEADING THE DEAF 479
in some cases refusing to the extent that they are physically re-
moved by the police.278 These mass actions attract attention and
demonstrate the force of this historically disregarded group.279 This
new visibility is critical; Trump’s actions have not only ignited a new
wave of disability activism but have also increased societal aware-
ness of disability rights awareness that will be critical in achieving
lasting equality.280
As the disability rights movement advances, it intersects with
the fight of other marginalized groups.281 45,000 people with disabil-
ities attended the Women’s March on Washington; not only was this
possibly the largest gathering of people with disabilities in our
nation’s history, but it marks a new level of intersection and visibil-
ity for the movement as they become part of this larger agenda.282
This coalition, across multiple communities, is what will create the
enlightened society that can ensure truly equal treatment of our
country’s largest minority.283
CONCLUSION
The deaf community faces many obstacles when traversing a
world that was not designed to accommodate them.284 People who are
deaf have their own language, culture, and community that thrives
despite a lack of recognition and validation by hearing society.285
The United States has enacted statutory protections, like the ADA,
to ensure people with disabilities have equal access.286 However,
these protections can be misinterpreted by the courts, thus leading
to a serious absence of necessary accommodations. This deficiency in
accommodations can have the most detrimental effect when a per-
son with a disability is interacting with the criminal justice system.
In the case submitted to the Supreme Court, Updike v. Multno-
mah County, a deaf man was denied his requested accommodations
and was seeking compensatory damages.287 The perceived tension
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arose when deciding if a plaintiff, when claiming intentional discrimi-
nation, must prove they were denied an accommodation because of
animus or because of deliberate indifference.288 Through an analysis
of the different circuits’ application of the law, it is clear that a true
animus standard is not applied in order to recover compensatory
damages under Title II of the ADA.289 The Supreme Court’s denial
of certiorari implies that they too do not consider there to be a split
in the circuits.
While the application of deliberate indifference standard varies
circuit to circuit, the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation is most in line with
the purpose and remedial goals of the ADA.290 The Ninth Circuit
concluded that if a public entity does not defer to the individual’s
understanding of their required accommodation, the entity must show
there was another effective accommodation or that the requested
accommodation was not required.291 The Ninth Circuit justified this
standard by acknowledging the vast range of disabilities and the ap-
propriate auxiliary aids and services required by each individual.292
This is especially true for the deaf community. Deaf individuals
can range from bilingual in English and ASL to semilingual.293 Some
people who are deaf can communicate through writing, but others
cannot.294 Truly, the only person who should determine what accom-
modation is appropriate is the individual seeking the accommodation,
not the police officer or judge who has just met them. Unfortunately,
this contradicts the nation’s understanding of the disabled community.
The United States is reluctant to recognize the agency possessed by
individuals with disabilities. The general public would rather look
away and let officials make these critical determinations than to con-
cede autonomy to this stigmatized and underestimated population.
The political climate is not currently conducive to expanding the
rights of the disabled population; in fact, the situation for many
disabled Americans is worsening.295 This anti-disability agenda
manifests itself in restrictions of their freedom and threat to their
existence.296 Fortunately, it has inspired a new, more visible, and
more powerful disability rights movement that is actively fighting
for equal access and treatment.297 Hopefully these movements can
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force the nation to finally take notice of the disabled community and
recognize their capacity to determine their own needs.
A critical part of this movement is erasing the stigma attached
to disability. The first deaf president of Gallaudet coined a maxim
that encompasses Deaf pride: “deaf people can do anything hearing
people can do, except hear.”298 This is the mindset the state should
adopt when providing accommodations to the deaf community. Deaf
people are just as capable as hearing people to discern what accom-
modations they require. By encouraging the state to promote this
concept, we can push the general population past pity and toward
embracing progress and true equality, legal and otherwise, for this
marginalized community.
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